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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PROFESSORS CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILCOX.
ADULTERATION OF Foob.

Comnwnmealth v. Graustein & Co., Mass., 95 N. E. 97. Criminal Intent.
Rev. Laws, Ch. 56, Sec. 55, providing that whoever, himself, or by his servant or
agent, has in his possession with intent to sell adulterated milk, or milk to which
water or any foreign substance has been added, shall be punished, is not limited
to cases where the foreign substance has been added from a positive intentional
act, but extends to cases where foreign substances have been added through
intentional means or by acts attributable or not to negligence.
ALIENS.

U. S. v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 186 Fed. 391.
Act.

Construction of Immigration

Immigration Act, February 20, 1907, Ch. 1134, Sec. 19, 34 Stat. 904 (U. S.

Comp. St. Suppl., i9o9, p 458), provides that if the owner of any vessel bringing
an alien not entitled to enter, shall make any charge for the return of such
alien, or shall take any security from him for the payment of such charge, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Held, that such provision applies only to acts
done within the United States, since to construe it as applicable to acts occurring
wholly within foreign territory would render it violative of international law.
An indictment, alleging that defendant at Bremen collected return passage
from certain proposed immigrants, who were within the excluded classes,
and held the money as security for a charge to be made for deportation, 'did not
charge the taking of the money as security within the United States, since to
retain money taken in a foreign country was not a continuous repetition of the
"taking" within the United States by reason of the fact that the aliens were
brought to the United States and ordered deported because not entitled to enter.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER.

Scott v. State, Tex., Ct. Cr. App., 131 S. W. 1072. Specific Intent. Defendant was convicted of assault witlh intent to murder. He had severely stabbed

the victim of the assault with a knife having a blade about three and one-half
inches long. The testimony for the state showed that the attack was unprovoked. The defendant testified that the complainant attacked him with a post
auger, that he struck complainant with the knife to make him drop the auger,
that he could have cut complainant all to pieces had he so desired, but did not
strike him after he dropped the auger. His witnesses testified to the same
general effect. Held error to refuse to give a requested charge that if defendant
cut the complainant, without a predetermined intent to kill him, but only to disarm him, or to defend himself against the attack with the auger, defendant
would not be guilty of assault with intent to murder.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

People v. Bossert, Cal., 'Ct. of App., III Pac. 15. Compulsory Process-for
Defendant's Witnesses. The defendant, learning that material witnesses whom
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he had subpcenaed were not present, seasonably asked for a bench warrant to
compel their attendance. The court, to save expense to the county and to avoid
inconvenience to the witnesses, denied the motion, but permitted their testimony, given at a former trial, to be read. Held prejudicial error and a violation of the constitutional right to compulsory process, as the testimony of witnesses given in court is much more effective than that read to the jury in the
form of a deposition. The appearance and bearing of the witness on the stand
may enable the jury to determine that he is testifying truly.
People 'v. Dickerson, Mich., 129 N. 1W. 199. Judicial Appointment of Expert
Witnesses. A statute provided that in homicide cases, involving expert knowledge, the court should appoint expert witnesses, and the fact that they were so
appointed should be made known to the jury, but the prosecution and defense
might use other expert witnesses. On a trial for murder, in which the defense
was insanity, the court appointed two medical experts. Held, the statute is unconstitutional as depriving the accused of due process of law, and imposing
executive duties upon a judicial officer. The selection and appointment of witnesses is not a judicial act. The appointment is to be made without notice
to either the prosecution or defense. The reasons for the selection made are
not of record and can never be known. The proscuting attorney cannot indorse
their names on the indictment, and the right of the accused to know their
names in advance, that he may examine into their character, means or knowledge,
etc., to properly prepare his defense, is impaired. The jury will give undue
weight to the testimony of these witnesses, and but scant consideration to that
of experts not so appointed. If their testimony, "being against the accused, were
either wilfully false or ignorantly mistaken, its baneful results would be appalling.
To give to the testimony of a witness or witnesses this extraordinary certificate
of candor, ability, and truthfulness, while the other testimony in the case must
be judged by the jury by ordinary standards, is to subvert the very foundations
of justice." While the statute "was designed to correct an evil long recognized
as tending to bring the administration of the criminal law into disrepute, the true
remedy for this evil rests in the development of a livelier sense of responsibility
to the public for the proper and decent administration of justice on the part of
both the legal and medical professions, rather than in revolutionary legislation."
Conviction reversed.
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Company, 34 Suppl., Ct. Rep. 492. Civil
or Criminal. A punitive sentence appropriate only to a proceeding at law for
criminal contempt, where the contempt consisted in doing that which had been
prohibited by an injunction, could not properly be imposed in contempt proceedings which were instituted, entitled, tried, and, up to the moment of sentence,
treated, as a part of the original cause in equity.
EVIDENCE.

People v. Madas, N. Y., 94 N. E. 857. Dying Declaration. A competent
dying declaration can be made by acts instead of words, as by nodding the head
and pointing, where declarant is unable to speak. Sufficient foundation for the
admission of dying declarations was laid where declarant indicated that he believed that he was about to die, that he had no hope of recovery, and that he
desired to make a statement how he was injured.
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State v. Badnelley, R. I., 79 Atl. 834. Res gestce. In a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape, where the prosecutrix had made complaint in
the house to members of the household as they came in soon after the offense, is
her complaint to her husband, made about one hour after the offense, is adadmissible as a part of the res gestae.
EXTRADITION.

People ex -el. American Surety Company v. Benham, 128 N. Y. Suppl. 6io.
Who Is Fugitive From Justice? One convicted of an offense against a state,
who, before the expiration of that sentence, was delivered to the federal authorities to serve out a prior sentence, would at the end of that sentence be a fugitive
from justice under the United States Constitution, and could be taken by the state
under the direct provisions of Rev. Stat. U. S., Sec. 5278 (U. S. Comp. Stat., i9ol,
p. 3579).
Strassheiin v. Daily, 31 Suppl. Ct. Rep. 558. Fugitive From Justice.
One who does, within the state, an overt act which is, and is intended to be, a
material stop towards accomplishing a crime, and then absents himself from the
state, and does the rest elsewhere, becomes a fugitive from justice for extradition purposes when the crime is complete, if not before.
HOmICmE.

McMahan v. State, Ala., 53 So. 89. Inducing Suicide. On a trial for homicide there was some evidence that deceased had shot himself, under an agreement
with defendant that both should commit suicide. Held, whatever was murder at
common law is murder under the statute. At common law he who incited another to commit suicide was guilty of murder if the other, in consequence, committed suicide in his presence, and was an accessory before the fact if the suicide was committed in his absence. In the latter case he was not punishable, as
an accessory could not be convicted before the conviction of the principal. But
under a statute abolishing the distinction between principals in the first and second degrees and accessories before the fact, and making them all principals, the
defendant may be punished though he was absent when the suicide occurred.
But if the deceased were so insane as not to be responsible for his acts, it seems
that the instigator who had incited him to suicide, but was not present, could
not be punished under the statute, as the statute applies only when the act is a
felony, and if the deceased was irresponsible there was no principal and hence
no accessory before the fact.
People v. Lumsden, N. Y., 94 N. E. 859. Self-Defense. An instruction
that if deceased believed accused was armed with a deadly weapon, and that he,
deceased, was in great danger therefrom, he was justified in seeking to protect
himself and in disarming accused, and, if he was so doing, accused was not
justified in shooting him while doing it, was erroneous, there being no qualifica-

tion that deceased's belief of danger must have rested on some reasonable
ground. That the court had previously correctly instructed on self-defense did
not render error harmless.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMUATION.

Jackson v. State, Tex., Ct. Cr. App. 131 S. W. 1076. Laful Money. An indictment for robbery charged the taking of two $20 bills, five $IO bills and two $5
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bills, "lawful and current money of the United States of America." Held, that
a request to charge that the term "lawful money" is restricted to legal tender
coin or legal tender treasury notes, and does not include United States treasury
warrants, gold certificates, nor bank bills, though they pass as current, was properly refused.
Bader v. State, Ind., 94 N. E. ioo9. Sufficiency. If the meaning is clear,
mistakes in grammar, spelling, or punctuation will not vitiate an information,
and where the affidavit in a prosecution for presenting a false claim for work
dbne to county officers for allowance sufficiently showed the beginning and ending of the claim presented, which was set out verbatim, failure to place the
language of the claim in quotation marks did not vitiate the affidavit, accused
not having been misled thereby.
Agar v. State, Ind., 94 N. E. 8ig. Variance. The variance between an indictment charging an embezzlement of a check of a corporation, payable to
"Henry E. Agar, Secretary," accused, and the check introduced in evidence.
made payable to "H. E. Agar, Sec'y," is not material and must be disregarded
on appeal, as required by Burns' Ann. Stat. 19o8, Sec. 2221.
Andrews vz. State, Ga., Ct. App., 70 S. E. iii. Variance. An indictment
charged that accused unlawfully discharged a pistol "while in a passenger car."
The proof was that he discharged it while on the steps or platform of the car.
Held the variance was not material.
Montgomery v. State, Tex., Ct. Cr. App., 131 S. W. 1087. Omission of
urat. A statute prohibited the presenting of an information unless the offense
was charged under oath. The prosecuting witness made an affidavit charging
the offense, but the district attorney, who administered the oath, failed to add his
jurat to the affidavit at that time. After the affidavit and information based
upon it had been filed and the defendant arrested and held to bail, the district
attorney, without leave of the court, attached his jurat to the affidavit. Defendant objected before the trial. Held that, though the affidavit could have been
corrected under leave and by direction of the court, it was dangerous practice
to permit such amendments out of the presence of, and without the authority
and direction of the court, and without any showing that the witness had been
sworn by the person who made the jurat. Conviction reversed.
U. S. v. I. Lindsay Wells Company, 186 Fed. 238. Infamous Crime. Rev.
St., Sec. 1022 (U. S. 'Comp. St., 1901, p. 720) provides that "all crimes and
offenses committed against the provisions of chapter 7, title 'Crimes,' which
are not infamous," may be prosecuted either by indictment or by information
filed by a district attorney. Food and Drugs Act, June 30, 1go6, Ch. 3915, Sec 2,
34 Stat. 768 (U. S. Comp. St. Suppl., 19o9, p. 1188), prohibits the shipping of
adulterted food in interstate commerce, and provides on conviction a fine not
exceeding $200 for the first offense, and for each subsequent offense a fine not
exceeding $300, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion
of the court. Held, that, since a defendant may not be imprisoned in the penitentiary unless sentenced to confinement for more than one year, no imprisonment can be imposed for violation of such act: and hence the institution of
proceedings thereunder by information of the district attorney was not a violation of Consf. U. S. Amend. 5, providing that no person shall be held to answer
for an infamous crime, except on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.
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Etheredge v. U. S., 186 Fed. 434. Post Office. "Scheme to Defraud." An
indictment for violating Rev. St., Sec 5480, as amended by Act of Congress,
March 2, 1889, Ch. 393, Sec. I, 25 Stat. 873 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p 3696), prohibiting the use of the United States mails in furtherance of a "scheme or
artifice to defraud," must allege, not only that the defendants had devised a
scheme or artifice to defraud, but must also plead facts showing what thea rtifice
was, wherein the fraud consisted, and how it was to be accomplished, the
words "scheme or artifice" not being equivalent to a plan or mode of effecting
a fraud, but must be a plan so cunningly devised and presented as to appeal to
human passion for gain, by untruthful and seductive embellishment of advantages, begetting confidence where it would not otherwise be bestowed: and
hence an indictment merely charging that defendant caused another to order a
diamond ring from complainant to be paid for on the installment plan, through
the United States mails, with intent not to pay for the same, did not charge a
scheme to defraud, and was therefore insufficient.
U. S. v. American Naval Stores Company et al., 186 Fed. 592. Duplicity.
Under Sherman Anti-Trust Act, July 2, i8go, -Ch. 647, Sec 2, 26 Stat. 209 (U. S.
Comp. Stat.,'I9OI, p. 3200), which makes it a misdemeanor to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize * * * any part of the trade or commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations," monopolization and attempting to monopolize such commerce are separate offenses and cannot be included in one count
of an indictment.
U. S. v. Munday et al., 186 Fed. 375. Conspiracy. Alaska Coal Lands
An indictment averring that defendants conspired to defraud the United States
of coal lands in Alaska by inducing persons to locate and acquire title to claims
thereon under the statute to be later transferred to a corporation, so as to enable
it to thereby acquire a greater quantity of coal land than allowed by law, and
that defendants pursuant to such conspiracy, aided such claimants in making proof
and payment for their lands, is insufficient to charge the crime of conspiracy
to defraud the United States under Rev. St., Sec. 5440 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p.
3676), where it does not show that the claimants, were dummies, but avers that
they were qualified to make the entries, and does not charge that they did not
fully comply with the law to entitle them to make proof and obtain patents.
INSTRUCTIONS.

Smith v. State, Ga., Ct. App., 70 S. E. 42. Harmless Error. The trial
court gave an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, though there was no
evidence upon which to base it. Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Held that though it was technically erroneous to give such instruction, the error was harmless, as the verdict showed that the instruction had been
disregatded.
JURISDICTION.

People ex rel. American Surety Company v. Benham, 128 N. Y. Suppl. 61o.
The court first obtaining jurisdiction of person or property retains it to the end,
and cannot be deprived thereof: and hence, where a federal court obtained jurisdiction of one accused of conspiracy, it did not lose jurisdiction because a state
court tried and sentenced him for another offense while out on bail during the
pendency of an appeal from the judgment of the federal court.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW
JUVENILE COURTS.

Arrandell v. State, Tex., Ct. Cr. App., 131 S. W. lO96. Age of Offender.
A statute provided that when a male juvenile under the age of sixteen was indicted for any felony, on motion the judge, if satisfied by evidence that the juvenile was less than sixteen, might turn him over to the juvenile court. A defendant indicted for murder filed such motion, supported by an affidavit that
though he was then seventeen years old, he was less than sixteen when the offense was committed, as charged in the indictment. Held, the statute gave the
district court a discretion which would not be revised on appeal unless abuse
was clearly shown. The district court properly refused to send the case to the
juvenile court, as the object of the statute was to remove children of tender
years from the association of confirmed felons and bad characters, and place
them under a training to develop their characters and fit them for useful citizenship, hence the statute related to the age of the party at the time of the trial,
rather than at the time of the commission of the offense.
RAPE, STATUTORY.

Cecil v. Commonweall, Ky., Ct. App., 131 S. W. 781. On Illegitimate Child.
A statute providing that ",Whoever shall carnally know his * * * child,
* * * knowing such relation to exist, shall be guilty of felony," applies to
illegitimate as well as to legitimate children.
Nider v. Commonwealth, Ky., Ct. App., 131 S. W. io24. Attempt an Included Offense. Consent. Defendant was convicted of satautory rape upon a
girl under the age of sixteen years. The evidence showed there was no penetration. Statutes provided for conviction of a lower degree of a crime than
the one charged in the indictment, and of any offense included in the crime
charged; and that where the offense was charged to have been committed with
particular circumstances, there might be a conviction of the offense without
the circumstances, or with part only, though the charge may have been a felony,
and the offense, without the circumstances, a misdemeanor only. Held, as penetration is a necessary element in the offense charged, the conviction must be
reversed. But if the defendant took possession of a female under the age of
consent, by laying hands upon her, and endeavored to have carnal knowledge of
her, but for any reason failed, he was guilty of an attempt. Her consent would
be no defense, as "The statute was enacted to protect female children who are
of such tender years as to be unable to appreciate the enormity of this offense,"
and should be so construed as not only to "protect them from persons who actually commit the act of carnal intercourse, but as well to save them from those
who endeavor to do so." The common law as to crimes is in force in Kentucky,
and by that law an attempt to commit an offense is a misdemeanor, whether the
offense attempted was created by statute or was an offense at common law.
Under the above stautes there could be a conviction of the attempt under an indictment charging the statutory offense, and "the accused might have been subjected to any fine or imprisonment in the county jail, or both, that the jury saw
proper to inflict." Hence, the case was remanded for proceedings in conformity
with the opinion.
SEARCHES AND SFrzURFs.

Wilson v. U. S., 31 Suppl. Ct. Rep 538. Production of%Corporate Books.
The enforced production before a grand jury engaged in investigating the alleged
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criminal conduct of corporate officers, directors, and stockholders, of the letterpress copy books of the corporation for two specified months, in the possession
of its president, under a subpoena duces tecum directed to the corporation, does
not violate the provisions of the U. S. Const., 4th Amend., forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures.
SENTENCE.

Stale 'vs. Abbott, S. Car., 7o S. E. 6. Power to Suspend. Defendants were
convicted of gaming and each sentenced to pay a fine and be imprisoned for one
year. On payment of the fine the sentence as to imprisonment was to be suspended during good behavior. More than a year later they were ordered to
show cause why the stay should not be revoked. At the hearing on this order
it appeared that they had again been guilty of gambling and the court evidently
revoked the stay and ordered the sentence of imprisonment enforced. In the
interval between the sentence and the revocation of the stay, the punishment for
gaming was reduced by statute. An appeal was taken on the ground that the
court had no power to suspend sentence and the attempt to do so rendered it
void. Held, at common law a trial court has no general power to suspend
sentence, but its power to do so is limited to cases in which the suspension is
necessary to protect the convict from the irretrievable loss of some legal right,
hence the clause in the judgment suspending the sentence was void, but the
sentence was valid. A "sentence is satisfied, not by the lapse of time after it is
pronounced, but by the actual suffering of the imprisonment imposed by it,"
and the court retains jurisdiction to enforce its judgment. The change in the
statute is immaterial, as the court is not passing a new sentence, but is enforcing the sentence legally imposed before the change.
STATuT s

Andrews v. State, Ga., Ct. App., 70 S. E. iii. Construction. A statute relating to railroad and street railroad cars provided that any person who should
"shoot, while in such car, any" weapon, should be punished. Held, that it was
a violation of the statute to discharge a pistol from the steps or platform of
such car, as the context indicated that the entire car was within the terms of
the act and the word "in" is ordinarily used as an equivalent of the word "on."
TRIAL.
People v. Bernstein, Ill., 95 N. E. 50.

Conduct of Judge.

During the

trial the judge asked numerous questions of the defendant and his witnesses,

and examined two witnesses in chief, and allowed the state's attorney to crossexamine, there being nothing in the records explaining why this was done,
and the questions being such as would appear to the jury to be in the interest
of the prosecution. Held reversible error.
People v. Guile, 128 N. Y. Suppl. 734. Inspection of Minutes of Grand
Jury. The sole purpose for which the minutes of the grand jury may be inspected is to permit accused to move to set aside the indictment under Code Cr.
Proc., Sec. 313, requiring it to be set aside whn not found, indorsed, and presented as prescribed by statute, and when a person has been permitted to be
present during th session, one indicted for rape was not entitled to inspect the
minutes of the grand jury on the ground that a former grand jury before which
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the same witnesses testified failed to find an indictment, so that the second indictment must have been found upon insufficient and illegal evidence.
State v. Barr, Dela., 79 Atl. 730. Necessity of Plea. There can be no,
valid trial, except upon an issue joined. It is absolutely necessary in a criminal case that a plea be entered. It satisfactorily appearing to the court that
neither before, nor during, nor, since the trial was there any plea of any kind
either by he defendant or his counsel, and no appeal having been taken a
new trial must be granted.
WITNESSES.

Wilson
"v. U. S., 31 Suppl. Ct. Rep. 538. Self-Incrimination. Corporation
Cannot
Claim
the Privilege. A corporation cannot resist, upon the ground of
the constitutional protection against self-incrimination, the compulsory production of its books and papers before the grand jury under a subpcena duces
tecum.
The privilege against self-incrimination afforded by U. S. Const., 5th
Amend., does not protect the officer of a corporation, in resisting the compulsory production before the grand jury, under a subpcena duces tecum directed
to the corporation, of the letter-press copy books of such corporation in his
possession, because the contents thereof may tend to incriminate him, even
though the inquiry before the grand jury was not directed to the corporation
itself.
Wilson v. U. S., 31 Suppl. Ct. Rep. 538. Right of Accused to List of Witnesses Before the Grand Jury. Neither the 6th Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, nor U. S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 829, U. S. Comp. Stat., i9oi, p. 636,
accords the right to the accused to be apprised of the names of the witnesses
who appeared before the grand jury.

